

CIP @ Siemens Mobility Use Cases

Agenda

1. Harmonization use case

Replacement of old Linux kernel versions

2. Maintenance use case


Benefit from long-term maintained Debian packages

3. Security use case

Create a common platform for IEC 62443 SL-3 ready products

4.-6 Security challenges

IEC 62443 SL-3 challenges and their OSS solutions



1. Harmonization use case

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Replacement of old Linux kernel versions

Rail automation specifics

- Long product life-times (20 to 30 years)
- Patching of products is not easy
- Requires safety assessment & certification
- Access to devices is difficult (e.g. no remote access)

Numerous Linux kernel versions in product portfolio

- Hard to maintain
- Even harder to keep up with vulnerability management

Solution: reduction of Linux kernel variants

- Using CIP kernel as basis for product portfolio

2. Maintenance use case

Benefit from long-term maintained Debian packages

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Benefit from long-term maintained Debian packages

Benefits of Debian

- Packages come preconfigured (lower effort for integration, compared to „make ...“)
- Easier management of Open Source Software (license compliance, vulnerability management, ...)
- Reduced build times through ISAR using binary packages
- Covers all required CPU architectures

Requirement from a rail automation customer

- “The used Linux distribution shall be **Debian** for **cybersecurity** reasons”

CIP Core

- Efforts for Debian LTS maintenance are a **perfect fit** for this use case

3. Security use case

Create a common platform for IEC 62443 SL-3 ready products

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Create a common platform for IEC 62443 SL-3 ready products

CIP Security WG

- Participate in the CIP Security working group
- Provide guidelines for IEC 62443 compliance for products using the CIP

Siemens Mobility OSS contributions

- Contribute security building blocks to OSS community
- Peer review increases security
 - **Security by obscurity never works!**
- Increase supported **hardware**
- Possible increase of **features** through collaboration
- Increase the **overall security** for the industrial automation domain



4. IEC 62443 SL-3 Challenge

Certificate enrollment in closed networks

4. Challenges

Certificate enrollment in closed networks

IEC 62443 requirement for SL-3

- When a Public Key Infrastructure is used, the device shall integrate into a system which ensures that certificates are enrolled securely.

Current situation

- Most rail automation products **don't use certificates**
- If certificates are used they are typically self-signed
- Typically **no integration with PKI possible**

4. Solution


Use the Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)

Certificate Management Protocol

- Specified in RFC4210
- Allows to **enroll**, **renew** and **revoke** certificates
- Can be used to distribute CRLs
- Key material is **generated on** the device only
- Already used in the rail automation domain (UNISIG 137 standard)

Flexible support of transport protocols

- Message exchange can be done via various protocols
- Plain TCP
- HTTP
- Using files (e.g. SCP, usb drive, ...)



4. Solution

Use the Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)

Noteworthy Implementations

CMPforOpenSSL (<https://github.com/mpeylo/cmposs1>)

- Initially started by Nokia, Siemens joined several years ago
- Already integrated in many industrial products
- Integrated in upcoming **openSSL 3.0**

CMP in memory constrained environments

- mbedCMP (<https://github.com/siemens/mbedCMP>)
- CMPclient-embedded-lib (<https://github.com/nokia/CMPclient-embedded-lib>)

For less constrained environments

- Bouncy Castle (<https://www.bouncycastle.org/>)

5. IEC 62443 SL-3 Challenge

OSS has to access credentials in a secure way

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OSS has to access credentials in a secure way

IEC 62443 requirement for SL-3

- Credentials which are used by the component shall be **protected** by **hardware means**

Typical OSS components load credentials from files

- Usually the **password** for the private key is **stored** in **plain text** in a configuration file

Many available hardware key store implementations

- Different functionality
- **Different** software **interfaces**

5. Solution


The Trust Anchor API

Trust Anchor functionality

- Derive **individual passwords** for each device
- Seed the random number generator (esp. for devices with **low entropy**)
- Get an **UUID** identifying the device

Derive hardware-specific passwords

- Allows applications to use these passwords to **protect its credentials**
- E.g. by an **OpenSSL engine**



5. Solution

The Trust Anchor API

Bound to the hardware


- Requires **live OS access** to get the password
- Reading the flash/stealing the HDD **does not reveal the credentials**

Designed for embedded systems

- Limited feature set allows to use various kinds of embedded hardware (no TPM required)

Plugin architecture

- Hardware specific implementation of the trust anchor can be loaded as a **plugin**
- Allows hardware manufacturers to **implement hardware access** (driver / hardware plugin)
- **No changes in applications required** for different hardware



6. IEC 62443 SL-3 Challenge

Securely boot x86 devices

6. Challenge

Securely boot x86 systems

IEC 62443 requirement for SL-3

- The products manufacturers **root of trust** shall be used to verify the boot process.

Root of trust

- For x86 UEFI devices the manufacturer **root of trust has to be installed in the UEFI**

Dual boot


- **A/B partition scheme** required for reliable remote software update

6. Solution

Use efibootguard

Open Source UEFI Bootloader

- <https://github.com/siemens/efibootguard>
- GPL-2
- Already supports **swupdate** for A/B partition update
- UEFI Secure Boot support planned for **Q3/2020**



Possible scheme for Secure Boot implementation, final solution t.b.d.

Outlook: Siemens Mobility OSS Projects

New projects

Trust Anchor API

Target: Q2/20

Sponsorship

CMPforOpenSSL/openSSL 3.0

Target: Q1/20

efibootguard – Secure Boot

Target: Q3/20

ISAR

Continuous

A lot of space for
upcoming contributions!

Stay safe and secure

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